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Editorial on the Research Topic
Affectivity Beyond the Skin
A growing number of researchers in cognitive science challenge the idea that we can understand
the mind by just looking at the brain (Hurley, 1998; Gallagher, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Clark, 2008;
Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). They argue that our psychological capacities are realized not just by
our brain but also our bodies, as well as the complex ways these bodies interact with their material
and social environments. For these “4E” approaches, our psychological capacities are embodied,
or realized by our physiology and agency; embedded, or situated within environmental niches that
support and constrain them; enacted, or reflective of our first-person activities of sense-making and
meaning-creation; and perhaps even extended beyond the head by material and social resources
around us.
At the heart of 4E approaches is the idea that processes like believing, remembering, and
reasoning depend upon resources beyond the head. The artifacts and cultural institutions we use
to support these processes are forms of cognitive “scaffolding”: beyond-the-head structures that,
when we interact with them, generate ongoing feedback loops that transform our cognitive profile
in real-time by opening up new forms of thought and experience.
An important recent development in 4E circles has been an investigation of how moods
and emotions might be similarly scaffolded (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009; Greenwood, 2013;
Merritt, 2013; Colombetti, 2014; Krueger, 2014a,b; Slaby, 2014; Stephan et al., 2014; Colombetti
and Krueger, 2015; Colombetti and Roberts, 2015; Roberts, 2015; Carter et al., 2016; Krueger
and Szanto, 2016). These works examine the many ways we regulate, organize, and maintain our
affective life by manipulating everyday artifacts and spaces. We make and listen to music, adorn
walls with artworks, consume drugs, wear specific clothing, and gravitate toward spaces and social
groups to evoke and regulate different affective experiences. These practices construct “affective
niches”: self-styled environments providing the developmental conditions for affective states to take
shape and thrive.
“Affectivity Beyond the Skin” is an investigation of some of the many ways affectivity can
be scaffolded by resources beyond the head. Each contribution challenges the common view in
emotion science that affective states can be characterized by focusing exclusively on internal states
of an individual’s brain and body.
Wilutzky’s rejects the idea that the intentional character of emotions—their being about things
and states of affairs—is a representational feature of inner mental states. Instead of this headbound
picture, Wilutzky develops a rich action-oriented picture of emotional intentionality according to
which emotions are actions that guide our dealings with the world and help us learn things about
it. As Joona Taipale’s tells us, one of the things we learn is how to regulate our affective states in
response to the people and things around us. Drawing on an impressive body of developmental
literature, Taipale convincingly argues that our ability to self-regulate affect is ontogenetically
dependent upon the management and guidance of caregivers.
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Paul Elvers and Michelle Maiese continue these explorations
in an aesthetic register. Elvers’s develops an account of musical
self-enhancement. He inaugurates a new research trajectory by
showing howmusic scaffolds feelings of self-esteem and empathy,
leading to richer forms of social interaction and interpersonal
relatedness. Maiese’s is a nuanced investigation of the power of
expressive arts like Dance-Movement Therapy to scaffold new
ways of inhabiting the world and relating to others. These arts,
she argues, enable multifaceted and embodied “affective styles” of
moving, speaking, and interacting that can be put to work in the
context of therapy and peacebuilding.
Slaby’s also explores affective styles—but instead of therapy
and peacebuilding, he considers more troubling cultural and
political implications. For Slaby, “affective mind invasion” occurs
when an individual’s affective dispositions are scaffolded by their
local subcultures: e.g., corporate workplaces, social web-based
groups, academia, the world of sports, or police and military
culture. Over time, individuals within these domains habitually—
and not always with full awareness and consent—adopt affective
styles normative in the domain in question.
Alessandro Salice, Alba Montes Sánchez, Thomas Szanto,
and Gavin Sullivan also focus on socially situated affect.
Salice and Sánchez’s develop a subtle account of “hetero-
induced” shame and pride. Against accounts that portray
these emotions as essentially self-directed, their account shows
how group identification, or the feeling of being interrelated
with and evaluated by others, shapes the character and
intentional structure of these emotions. Affectivity and group
identification is also the topic of Szanto’s discussion. Szanto
addresses a lacuna in contemporary discussions of akrasia—
most of which focus on individual irrationality—with his
account of “collaborative” akrasia. For Szanto, core socio-
psychological mechanisms of group-level akrasia consist of
interpersonally-scaffolded processes of emotion regulation that
generate “collaborative spiraling of practical irrationality”:
affective feedback loops that reinforce irrational tendencies
of group members and animate their behavior. Some similar
themes are found in Sullivan’s. Drawing upon ethnographic
observations of life in downtown Johannesburg before and
after the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, Sullivan develops a
careful investigation of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms
enabling the spread of shared emotions like pride and
euphoria.
Finally, Michael’s is a brief but substantive discussion
of shared emotions. Michael surveys competing accounts of
shared emotions, arguing that these accounts are, in fact, not
incompatible with one another. Instead of picking out a natural
kind, the term “shared emotion” refers to a motley of overlapping
phenomena worthy of further interdisciplinary investigation—a
fitting coda to this wide-ranging research topic.
It is our hope that this rich and varied collection will serve as
the basis for new directions of research investigating affectivity
beyond the skin.
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